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ABSTRACT
The concept of trust best explains the true nature of contract law
and is found in key contract-law doctrines, such as good faith and
public policy. By identifying contractual expectation with the idea of
trust and by considering the actual expectations of the contracting
parties, as well as the ideal expectations of the public, this Article de-
velops the triangle-of-expectations model-the most coherent account
of contract law today. This model, conceptually different than classic
contract theory, also contributes to stability, certainty, and the con-
tracting parties' ability to rely on each other as well as on the contrac-
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tual institution. Most importantly, it also explains the complex
economic, social, and communal interactions that modern contract
law is asked to face-many of which are no longer based on freedom
of contractual choice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The question below is from a test for pre-law students:
Which type of law governs all but one of the following activities?
Wake up from cell phone alarm, make coffee in an electric pot,
leave rented apartment, pay for a day pass and ride the subway,
clock in at work, finish work, go to a movie with tickets ordered
online, stop at an all-night pharmacy to pick up medicine paid for by
health insurance, take a subway ride home, set alarm on cell phone,
and go to sleep.
a. Equity
b. Criminal
c. Contract
d. Family
As the test question above shows, contractual interaction is so com-
mon and dominant in daily life that it is likely the most significant and
widely-used legal act.' It goes without saying, therefore, that under-
standing the essence of contract law and its implications on specific
interactions, as well as its broader implications on society at large, is
of greatest relevance and significance in the modern era. In the past,
contract law focused on regulating the contracting parties' voluntary
interactions according to the will theory. But today contract law regu-
lates an array of much broader and more complex economic, social,
and public interactions, many of which are not based on the parties'
mutual intent and freedom of contractual choice in its classical sense.
Hence, today, this classic theory no longer explains the contractual
institution vis-A-vis the rising power of the corporate world and the
popularity of mass contracts-with banks, employers, pension funds,
cellular companies, hotels, etc.-signed by most on a regular basis
without even reading, and certainly without negotiating or having the
power to negotiate, the terms and conditions of these contracts. 2
1. Contract law addresses a variety of legal interactions ranging from simple, such as buying a
cup of coffee, to complicated and sophisticated transactions, such as buying an apartment, orga-
nizations' bylaws, or corporate mergers. Without always recognizing it, many of our activities
are impacted by contracts almost every hour of the day, such as taking a taxi to work-arranged
by contract with the transport provider-using credit cards to pay for the fare-used pursuant to
a contract with the issuing bank-and so on. Most people in our modern society are involved in
numerous contractual acts daily.
2. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACrS § 1.7 (3d ed. 2004); see Andrew
Robertson, The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 179 (2005); see also
TRUST AND THE TRIANGLE EXPECTATION MODEL
This Article takes up the challenges found in modern contract law
and offers a new, unified approach. In addition to examining the new
social and business reality discussed above, the suggested theory takes
into account both the rising position of basic doctrines in contract law,
such as principles of good faith and public policy that have been signif-
icantly developed and introduced into contract law, and the considera-
tions of fairness and paternalism,3 which appear to clash with the
autonomous exercise of individual will. 4 This mission is especially
challenging considering that contractual interaction is fundamental,
widespread, and diverse, and bears on social values to a great extent.5
With this in mind, this Article advances the concept of trust as the
central, social foundation for modern contract law. This idea is
grounded in the link between trust and expectation-both implicit in
contractual interactions. Moreover, expectation is analyzed in this
Article with a broader perspective than before. One of this Article's
main contributions is the claim that a systematic study of the various
contractual doctrines shows-contrary to the conventional view-a
concern not only for expectations of the promisee but also for those of
the promisor and the public. Accordingly, this Article suggests a
three-dimensional perspective, termed the "triangle of expectations."
The triangle of expectations also provides an explanation for the
occasional subordination of contract law, which allegedly planned to
protect the subjective will of the parties, to objectivity tests, which
emphasize the reasonableness of the parties' will, and to constitutional
principles that must be obeyed within contractual interaction as well.
In this sense, the proposed model also serves to construct desirable
interpersonal expectations, emphasizes the societal essence of the con-
tractual institution, and affords additional understanding of the grow-
James Gordley, Contract, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIEs (Peter Cane & Mark
Tushnet eds., 2003).
3. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 7.17 (b) ("The concept of good faith has, in a relatively few
decades, become one of the peculiarly American cornerstones of our common law of con-
tracts."). "Occasionally ... a court will decide that this interest in party autonomy is outweighed
by some other interest and will refuse to enforce the agreement or some part of it." Id. § 5.1.
4. Cf FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 1.7.
5. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1743, 1753 (2000) ("In contrast to the formal reasoning of classical contract law, modern contract
law reasoning is substantive. That is, modern contract law seeks to justify doctrines on the basis
of social propositions.").
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ing affinity of contract law to human rights 6 and of the tendency to
weaken the distinction between public and private law.7
This Article continues as follows. Part II probes the idea of trust
and its conceptual affinity to the law of contracts. It shows how the
idea of trust corresponds to the inner logic of the contractual institu-
tion, including its implicit elements of promise, mutuality, and cooper-
ation, and also embodies basic and primary normative, social,
economic, and personal advantages even with respect to the doctrine
of will. This part also questions whether contract law, as a legal insti-
tution, can have a bearing on the idea of trust as a social convention.
Part III is devoted to developing the triangle of expectations as a
model that includes the idea of trust in the modern law of contracts.
Part IV inquires into contract doctrines, obeying the triangle-of-ex-
pectations model: particularly invalid contracts, rules of good faith,
and contractual formation. This Article concludes by summarizing
and emphasizing its themes.
II. TRUST
A. Basis for Interrelationships and Contracting
The idea of interpersonal trust has personal, social, moral, psycho-
logical, and utilitarian advantages that are consistent with common
sense8 and easily relatable. Thus, it comes as no surprise that inter-
personal trust has been adopted into many fields, particularly social
and economic fields.9 From a social perspective, trust is understood as
6. See, e.g., 2 CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRIVATE LAW (Tom Barkhuysen & Siewert D.
Lindenbergh eds., 2006); HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW: PRIVACY As AUTONOMY (Katja S.
Ziegler ed., 2007); HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Dawn
Oliver & Jorg Fedtke eds., 2007); HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW (Daniel Friedmann &
Daphne Barak-Erez eds., 2001); THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING CON-
STITUTIONALISM (Ardrds Saj6 & Renita Uitz eds., 2005).
7. Cf Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1349 (1982).
8. Julian B. Rotter, Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and Gullibility, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 1, 1
(1980) ("Common sense tells us that interpersonal trust is an important variable affecting human
relationships at all levels.").
9. The broad applicability and fundamental importance of the idea of trust can be illustrated
anecdotally by the following statement from a popular swimming instruction manual: "Asked
what the single most important factor is in learning to swim, most people would reply 'Confi-
dence'. A sense of trust-what we have called being at home in the water-provides the foun-
dation for us to do whatever else might come naturally in the water." STEVEN SHAW & ARMAND
D'ANGOUR, THE ART OP SWIMMING: IN A NEW DIRECTION WITH THE ALEXANDER TECHNIQUE
89 (1988).
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a vital element in the relationship between people. 0 Mutual trust is a
tool that is used to avoid economic pitfalls." More specifically, inter-
personal trust promotes cooperation and contributes to economic per-
formance in large organizations.' 2
By the same token, trust is a central component in psychology and
is used to understand the development or lack thereof of healthy per-
sonalities.' 3 This centrality of trust to humans-in everything related
to maintaining the existence and quality of socioeconomic and collec-
tive life-necessarily suggests it should be reflected in law as well, es-
pecially in contract law, a basic institution for interpersonal social
interactions. The sense of interpersonal trust-confidence that the
desired expectation arising out of the other's promise will be ful-
filled-is essential in contractual deliberations.
Just as the contractual institution can gain much from the existence
of interpersonal trust as a cultural phenomenon, so too it can be a
powerful stimuli for instilling a culture of trust, thereby contributing
to stability and predictability-important foundations in the legal sys-
tem in general and contract law in particular. Since culture is defined
as a product of a vast number of choices made by millions of people,14
routine contractual encounters can be viewed as a component of over-
all cultural identity that is influenced by contract law's declarative and
coercive functions. However, the close connection between the idea
of trust and the institution of contracts is grounded in more than their
shared goals. Other considerations are at play as well.
First, expectation, which serves as a central axis in defining the idea
of trust, is defined as an individual's assessment, in a manner affecting
her actions and reliance on another person's or group's actions, sepa-
10. The importance of trust derives from the fact that "[mien are social animals ... because so
few of their needs can be satisfied except by coordinated and co-operative action." S. I. BENN &
R. S. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIc STATE 279 (1959).
11. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972); see also
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE Limrrs OF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974) ("Trust is ... extremely efficient;
it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word.").
12. Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 333, 336-37
(1997); see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 338 (1995).
13. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 96-97 (1968). The connection be-
tween psychological insights and the law of contract is based not only on the term expectation-
which is, after all, a term from the psychological sphere-but also on scientific ideas regarding
how decisions are formed. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1780-81; Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 (1986) (discussing
Eisenberg's comments on the premise of non-rationality, based on the studies of Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman).
14. James 0. Wilson, Human Remedies for Social Disorders, PuB. INT., Mar. 1998, at 25, 35
("Cultures grow up out of the countless small choices of millions of people.").
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rate from her ability to oversee that activity.' 5 Because this definition
flows from individual measurement or expectation of another's ac-
tions, it is a small jump to link the ideas of trust and expectation-the
central interest protected today by contract law-with the a priori po-
sition of trust within the framework of contract law.16 This insight is
reflected, for instance, in the growing support for the remedy of spe-
cific performance in American contract law17 and in protecting the
parties' reasonable expectations of each other through use of the good
faith principle-expectations that were established in the wake of con-
tractual promises.
Moreover, there is a deeper and more complex tie between contract
law and trust than the one implied by the link between promise and
trust. Contract law regulates fulfillment of promises, grapples with
surprise circumstances, which may arise during the course of contrac-
tual performance, and remedies impropriety or offenses against basic
social norms. In these situations as well, contract law primarily views
the idea of trust through principles of good faith and social policy, and
works to realize a culture of interpersonal trust. In sum, expectation
15. Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); see FUKUYAMA, supra note 12, at 26 ("Trust is the
expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based
on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community.") (emphasis ad-
ded) (suggesting the triangle of expectations and the expectations of the public); THE WESTMIN-
STER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 632 (James F. Childress & John Macquarrie eds., 1986)
("In its broad sense, trust is the expectation that the other will act in accord with his or her public
presentation of self; in its narrow sense, it is the expectation that the other will act morally.")
(emphasis added); see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 12, at 366 n.6 ("It is not sufficient that mem-
bers of the community expect regular behavior. There are many societies in which there is the
expectation that other people will regularly cheat their fellows; behavior is regular but dishonest,
and leads to a deficit of trust.") (discussing the interest in more than neutral expectations). For
another definition, also grounded in the term "expectation," see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1735, 1745-46 (2001) ("Scholars sometimes use the term 'trust' in different ways to mean
different things. In this Article, we use the word 'trust' to describe behavior with the three
following characteristics. First, trust involves at least two actors-the actor who trusts and the
actor who is trusted. Second, the trusting actor must deliberately make herself vulnerable to the
trusted actor in circumstances in which the trusted actor could benefit from taking advantage of
the trusting actor's vulnerability. Third, the trusting actor must make herself vulnerable in the
belief or expectation that the trusted actor will in fact behave 'trustworthily'-that is, refrain
from exploiting the trusting actor's vulnerability.") (footnotes omitted).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COTfRACTS § 1 (1981); see also id. § 344 (enumerating
the interests protected by contract law). While the reliance interest and the restitution interest-
the interest in avoiding unjust enrichment-are protected in other legal provisions as well, such
as tort law and the laws of unjust enrichment, the unique feature of the system of contract law is
the protection of the expectation interest.
17. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); M.
T. Van Hecke, Changing Emphasis in Specific Performance, 40 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1961); see also
Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 134 (1991).
[Vol. 11:379
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acts as a shared and enduring idea of trust and the institution of con-
tracts, marking their close connection.
Second, the idea of trust is consistent with other conventional ratio-
nales for the law of contract, i.e., maximizing utility, facilitating per-
sonal planning, allowing trade and market functioning, protecting
reasonable expectations and reliance, bolstering autonomy and indi-
vidual liberty, and establishing the moral force implicit in contractual
promise. The idea of trust appears to be implicit in these rationales,
effectively making their realization possible.18
Trust is a simple idea, consistent with common sense. 19 The idea of
trust does not focus on specific ethical or distributive concerns.
Rather, it is primarily a matter of creating conditions that favor fulfill-
ment of reasonable expectations. The principle of trust requires altru-
istic concerns not only for the other but also for her expectations,
which stem from the original promise and the meeting of the parties'
wills. As such, the idea of interpersonal trust is a basis for auton-
omy.20 Realization of reasonable expectations makes it possible to
realize self-interest. It operates to ensure confidence, certainty, stabil-
ity, and interpersonal harmony, all necessary ingredients of a legal
system.
Third, relationships based upon will are built at the start of pre-
contractual negotiations and continue through the formation and en-
suing performance. They are the most typical and familiar type of
relationships related to social and economic matters, giving rise to ex-
pectations and inviting trust in one's fellow. Thus, every contract can
be viewed as a microcosm of a "social contract." 2 1 Correspondingly,
the protection afforded to the value of interpersonal trust reflects the
status that law places on the idea of trust itself in a liberal, civil
society.
18. Cf Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 27
(2002) ("What is the common thread in these divergent accounts of contractual obligation? It is
that each invokes the notion of trust in explaining why it is appropriate for the law to enforce
certain promises.").
19. See Rotter, supra note 8.
20. This idea reflects, simultaneously, a deontological rationale and a utilitarian one. See Mel-
vin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 838
(1997).
21. Cf THoMAs HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 74-75 (Dover Publ'ns Inc. 2006) (1651) ("Again, one of
the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform
his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract
on his part is called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now, to perform hereafter:
in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called
Keeping of Promise, or Faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation of
Faith.").
2013] 385
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Fourth, the close linkage between contracts and interpersonal trust
is evident from their "interchangeability." On the one hand, if we
could foresee, formulate, oversee, and enforce detailed contracts con-
cerning all situations and developments, there would be no need for
interpersonal trust. On the other hand, a society placing great impor-
tance on interpersonal trust would have no need for contracts. A pos-
sible inference from this is that the widespread presence of detailed
contracts, frequent adjudication (in general), and the regular use of
good faith principles (in particular) do not give rise to instability, un-
certainty, and lack of trust. Instead, they result from the absence of
those values and have the potential to directly construct a culture of
trust.22
Fifth, anecdotally, one who keeps an agreement (even when she no
longer has any interest in doing so) is considered trustworthy. That
characterization-a characterization quite different from a person
known to fulfill her will and intent-provides powerful evidence that
it is the sense of trust, and not that of will or intent, that supports
contracts.
Sixth, a contract, by its very definition, is not a unilateral matter but
a voluntary meeting of the intentions of two or more parties. This
view underlies the laws of contract formation, and it provides the basis
for the rules of interpretation, which are directed toward uncovering
the intentions of the parties and their shared purposes. Thus, con-
tracts by nature express a social relationship that reflects will and a
shared expectation of cooperative exchange.23
Finally, the approach that posits trust as the meta-theory of contract
law can serve as a consistent descriptive tool for contract law in gen-
eral and especially for principles of good faith and public policy that
appear, at first glance, to be foreign to the institution of contract law
under its traditional rationale. 24
In sum, interpersonal trust embraces the law of contracts, which
necessarily entails the greatest potential for establishing trust, namely,
confidence in the realization of just expectations of participants in the
legal system, the ability to plan and rely on social interactions, and the
readiness to cooperate with one another. In this way, and through the
22. See Menachem Mautner, Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What Is So Problematic in the
Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 545, 558
(2002) ("Contract-making .. . is a functional equivalent of trust.").
23. As such, it also creates mutual power and the enforcement of relationships, recognized in
the law as establishing obligations of trust on one or another level. Cf Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983).
24. See infra Part IV.
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protection of the triangle of expectations-promisor, promisee, and
public-contract law contributes to legal stability and certainty. The
rest of this Article will be devoted to substantiate this claim, but first,
and before turning to examples of the triangle of expectations as a
means of interpersonal trust, whether and how contract law can ad-
vance the ideal of personal trust-an essentially social concept-
should be considered.
B. Intent, Promise, Expectation, and Interpersonal
Trust in Contract Law
The basic characteristics of the typical contract comprise elements
of reciprocity,25 mutuality, willfulness (that is, intent), promise, expec-
tation, interpersonal relationships,26 and cooperation. 27 Numerous ra-
tionales and values are rooted in these basic characteristics, but the
lion's share can be summarized by the idea of interpersonal trust, inti-
mately tied to the expectations of the parties involved in the contrac-
tual process. 28  Interpersonal trust draws on the notion of
expectation-an abstract and sophisticated idea preceding even that
25. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.1 ("The requirement of a bargain imposed by the doctrine
of consideration means that the parties' manifestations must have reference to each other, i.e.,
that they be reciprocal. Not only must the promisor seek the promise or performance that is the
consideration in exchange for the promise, but the promisee must give it in exchange for that
promise".); see also id. § 2.6.
26. As a practical matter, every contract creates or reflects some sort of relationship. See
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 805, 816
(2000) ("[V]irtually all contracts either create or reflect relationships. Discrete contracts-con-
tracts that are not relational-are almost as imaginary as unicorns. A contract to build some-
thing as simple as a fence creates a relationship. A contract to sell almost any commercial
product is likely to either create or reflect a relationship."); see also CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT
AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 45 (1981) ("Promises-and therefore
contracts-are fundamentally relational; one person must make the promise to another, and the
second person must accept it."); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 901
(1978). See generally Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004).
27. The existence of these characteristics is evident, directly or by implication, in the opening
paragraphs of the Restatement of Contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 1 (1981)
("A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy
. . . ."). The requirement of mutuality in American contract law can be seen in the requirement
of consideration and the idea of the "bargain" that underlies it. See id. § 171; Melvin Aaron
Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741, 742 (1982).
28. See, e.g., Gambetta, supra note 15, at 217 ("[T]rust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a partic-
ular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group
of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or indepen-
dently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own
action .... When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean
that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to
us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him."). For a
further definition and a comprehensive, updated sociological theory of trust, see PIOTR
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of reliance 29-which flows from the relationship and intentional
promise implicit in the contract. In fact, law in general, and not only
contract law, protects reasonable expectations and strives to instill the
idea of trust between two parties.30 In the specific area of contract
law, however, these expectations arise regarding the interpersonal
trust forged on the basis of interpersonal interactions and reciprocal
promises that are exchanged in the context of the contract and de-
mand cooperation. This special quality requires clarification and map-
ping of several terms and considerations.
First, the link between the idea of interpersonal trust and contract
law is certainly symbiotic but not circular. The sociocultural existence
of the idea of trust can strengthen the hope that expectations (includ-
ing contractual expectations) will be realized, but our interest here is
in the opposite vector, that is, the ability of contract rules, as a legal
mechanism, to support the concept of interpersonal trust by ensuring
the realization of expectations associated with the promises they pro-
tect. Moreover, and as we will see, the interest of the rules of contract
lies in protecting the triangle of expectations-in realizing not only
the concrete expectations of the parties to the contractual interaction
(the "promisor" and the "promisee") but also the reasonable and nor-
mative expectations of the public, a present yet silent observer that
relies on the institution of contract. In that way, rules of contract act
to protect and implement expectations that may be ideal, rather than
SZTOMPKA, TRUST: A SocoCoolCAL THEORY 25 (1999) ("TRUST IS A BET ABOUT THE
FUTURE CONTINGENT ACTIONS OF OTHERS.").
29. In their classic article on the subject, Fuller and Purdue see the protection of reliance as
the primary purpose of contract law; protecting expectation is secondary. L. L. Fuller & William
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). The develop-
ment of contemporary contract law shows, as a practical matter, a reversal of those priorities:
protecting expectation precedes and is independent of protecting the resulting reliance.
30. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTlON TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 176 (Transaction
Publishers 1999) (1922) ("Looking back over the whole subject, shall we not explain more phe-
nomena and explain them better by saying that the law enforces the reasonable expectations
arising out of conduct, relations and situations . . . ."); id. at 226 ("[In a civilized society] men
must be able to assume that those with whom they deal in the general intercourse of the society
will act in good faith, and as a corollary must be able to assume that those with whom they so
deal will carry out their undertakings according to the expectations which the moral sentiment of
the community attaches thereto."); see also ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW
81 (1942) [hereinafter POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL] ("It is seldom that a legal right is conferred
consciously and intentionally otherwise than as a recognition of reasonable expectations, or what
are believed to be reasonable expectations, expressing presuppositions of civilized life."); Bailey
H. Kuklin, The Justification for Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 29 HoFsTRA L. REv. 863
(2001); Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 32 VAL.
U. L. REV. 19, 19 n.1 (1997). Interestingly, though Kuklin offers various moral justifications for
the protection of reasonable expectations-including deontological justifications and justifica-
tions that rely on considerations of corrective justice, distributive justice, and intuitive justice-
he does not directly treat the idea of trust as intimately bound to the idea of expectation.
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real, and exemplify the active role played by the law in constructing a
culture of interpersonal trust in the institution of contracts, above and
beyond the passive role of contract law in reflecting and realizing ex-
isting expectations.
Second, the interjection of contract law into protecting expecta-
tion-arising out of a willful promise-shows the existence of a close
albeit somewhat confusing connection between protecting will (or in-
tent) and protecting the promise and expectation forged in conse-
quence of it. Contract law developed in the West as an expression of
individualism that sanctified individual will and autonomy. Accord-
ingly, court decisions and legal literature traditionally focused on in-
tent and will more than on the idea of interpersonal trust as a central
value to be protected by contract law. Yet, focus on autonomy of will
turns out, especially today, to lack the consistent capacity to provide a
harmonious justification and explanation for the internal develop-
ments as they occurred. Moreover, modern contract law is used in
many interactions in which willfulness is limited and makes use of pa-
ternalistic mechanisms to forge legal responsibility. 31 Given that, the
doctrine of will runs counter to the manner in which judges rule and to
rationales of courts in many disputes bearing on contract law today.32
To summarize, classical contract law is anachronistic, 33 overly nar-
row, and usually erroneous in regarding a contract as an act of will
and nothing more. To do so, moreover, misses other fundamental, so-
cial phenomena and goals that are bound up in the contractual institu-
tion-phenomena that are fundamental even to the concept of
"autonomy of the will" itself. In contrast, the idea of interpersonal
trust, constructed through the protection that contract law gives to
voluntary and desirable promises, affords a sound and coherent expla-
nation of the law and entails an array of broad and bountiful norma-
tive benefits that embrace will-based theories of contract law. Thus,
31. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.6.
32. There is good reason, therefore, to suggest abandoning the metaphor "meeting of the
minds" in examining the formation and content of contracts. Cf id.
33. See Gordley, supra note 2, at 3. Based on this claim and the shift that happens in contract
law, this Article takes a different view from the one raised by Lawrence Mitchell. In opposition
to the claim raised in this Article, Mitchell claims that contract law is actually one of the main
reasons for erosion of trust in our society, given its main concern in individual autonomy and its
encouragement of individuals to seek their own goals without regard for those of others. See
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185-217
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). However, given the current deteriorating status of autonomy
in contract law and the rising position of good faith and social order doctrines in modern con-
tract law, it is easier to notice the normative superiority of trust as a governing principle in
contract law over values of autonomy.
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ensuring expectations and the idea of interpersonal trust also serves,
in most instances, as a precondition to realizing will.
While the idea of promise in contract law is not new, the notion of
trust-implemented by the triangle of expectations protected by con-
tract law-is new. The opening section of the Restatement of Con-
tracts embodies this concept of promise,34 which is implicit in the
requirements for contract formation, namely, offer and acceptance.
The characteristics of promise-as a willful commitment giving rise to
expectation-are implicit in the tests of "certainty" and "specificity,"
which are enumerated in "offer" and "acceptance" when forming the
contract. Both offer and acceptance incorporate commitment and
constitute components of promise that create expectation on the part
of the other.35
Thus, the idea that expectation in contract law is a social value asso-
ciated with, and even more important than, autonomy of will is not
new.36 Corbin, for example, viewed contract law as intending first and
foremost to protect (reasonable) expectations of the parties. Corbin's
position is clear in the caption of the first paragraph of his treatise:
"The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable
Expectations Induced by Promises."37
In other words, expectation is what underlies the modern approach
to interests protected by contract law and is attached to the social
value of interpersonal trust more directly than to the social value of
will.38 Correspondingly, the rationale focused on the role of contract
law in protecting autonomous will cannot itself justify protecting the
promise and the justified (i.e., the legitimate and reasonable) expecta-
tions of the other party. Moreover, such a rationale cannot justify im-
posing the duty of proper interpersonal behavior on contracting
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
35. Cf ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs § 1.13 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev.
ed. 1993) ("The act constituting an offer and the act constituting an acceptance may each consist
in a promise.").
36. See id. §§ 20, 200-01; see also Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1756-60.
37. See CORBIN, supra note 35, § 1.1 ("That portion of the field of law that is classified and
described as the law of contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that have
been induced by the making of a promise. Doubtless, this is not the only purpose which moti-
vated the creation of the law of contracts; but ... it is believed that an understanding of many of
the existing rules and a determination of their effectiveness require a lively consciousness of this
underlying purpose."); see also Barry J. Reiter & John Swan, Contracts and the Protection of
Reasonable Expectations, in STUDIES IN CONTRACr LAw 1 (Barry J. Reiter & John Swan eds.,
1980); Johan Steyn, Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men, 113 L.
Q. REv. 433, 433-34 (1997).
38. The source of this approach is in the classic article by Fuller & Perdue, see supra note 29,
who emphasized the priority of the interest in reliance (though one must remember that reliance
flows from expectation). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344.
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parties by subjecting them to the basic principles of the legal system
through the public policy doctrine.
It should be emphasized that there is no denying that contract law
clearly aims to ensure the willfulness of the promise, which contributes
much to the idea of interpersonal trust. However, the intent of the
parties is not the main issue. Trust and will are intertwined in the
commercial and social world, which is based on cooperation and confi-
dence in the performance of future promises. The idea of interper-
sonal trust can advance subjective expectations as well as ideal ones.
Thus, trust has the capacity to express the "added value" of the prom-
ise implicit in the contract. This is because the promise, unlike purely
willful expression, bears on the future, creates expectations by the
other party, and entails cooperation. 39 Protecting these attributes
achieves broader social goals than those that focus solely on protect-
ing momentary will, by itself, and is better suited to the interpersonal
character of contractual interaction.
In addition, intent is certainly not a value unique to contract law; it
is also a fundamental component of civil and criminal law alike. How-
ever, contract law attends to particular expressions of intention-
which is, for example, different than intent in the context of a "Last
Will and Testament" and, as is suggested by its title, embodies a per-
son's will. While a will (and, in a certain sense, a gift) entails a unilat-
eral intentional act, which has a limited effect on another's
expectations, a contractual promise is a mutual act that exerts external
and social influence beyond the individual. Moreover, it proposes to
create expectation and reliance by the other party in order to realize
self-interest. The contractual promise creates a "bond," a personal
and cooperative relationship that usually involves both parties assum-
ing risks related to future circumstances. The contractual promise
protects not only a party's right to realize his or her will but also its
freedom to expect something from, to rely upon, and to cooperate
with another individual.40 When all is said and done, a party that
keeps promises is esteemed by society and known for his or her trust-
39. The centrality of the promise is evident in one of the classic statements of American con-
tract law, made by Williston in 1926 in the course of deliberations at the American Law Institute.
When asked about a case in which an uncle had promised to give his nephew $1,000 for the
purchase of an automobile but the nephew had bought a car for only $600, Williston replied that
the uncle should nonetheless be required to give the nephew the full $1,000, for the simple
reason that "[e]ither the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is binding it has to be
enforced as it is made." Yorio & Thel, supra note 17, at 117. For a comprehensive review of
authorities dealing with promise, see FRIED, supra note 26, at 137 n.9, 138 n.21.
40. Fulfilling a promise does not limit liberty; on the contrary, it enhances it inasmuch as a
promise is a person's independent and willful creation.
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worthiness. In keeping a promise, the promisee adheres to social in-
stitutions of expectation and trust. Thus, in an agreement, the
promisor trades not only his or her will but also the social institutions
of expectation and trust. The emphasis of trust and expectation avails
contract law with a richer meaning than does the traditional under-
standing, focused exclusively, and often artificially, on autonomy of
will.
The same can be illustrated by the process of contract interpreta-
tion. Even in this context, which is at the heart of contract law, civil
courts question the purposes, goals, and interests underlying the con-
tract and the parties' desire to fulfill it. Courts' inquiries into the par-
ties' goals and purposes reflect the manner in which contract law looks
toward culture to fulfill the parties' future expectations4 1 and empha-
size, primarily, parties' expectations, not merely their intentions.
Fried's approach in Contract as Promise42 Supports my thesis herein,
but the latter adds a different twist. Fried mostly bases his claim on
the "will theory," 43 which does not afford adequate emphasis on the
social concept of realizing expectation and interpersonal trust as an
institution and a social convention that plays an independent role in
contract law. Fried emphasizes liberal grounding for protecting prom-
ise as a willful act and, accordingly, focuses on the inherent moral
value of the promise implicit in a contract only as a powerful expres-
sion of the autonomy of the individual's will.4 4 In contrast, this Arti-
cle emphasizes promise as a powerful expression of interpersonal
trust.45
These variations in emphasis are not merely semantic. Rather they
can lead to different conclusions, for example, in connection with the
erosion of autonomy of the will. The idea of interpersonal trust can
harmoniously justify and account for contract law's protection of ex-
41. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 1.1.
42. FRIED, supra note 26.
43. Id. at 5-6 ("I begin with a statement of the central conception of contract as promise. This
is my version of the classical view of contract proposed by the will theory .... .").
44. Id. at 57 ("The moral force behind contract as promise is autonomy: the parties are bound
to their contract because they have chosen to be.").
45. As noted, Fried, too, emphasizes the importance of the idea of trust and the link between
it and protecting free will, but he treats the idea as a means for realizing the shared will and
concretizing the ability of one person to use another to attain his goals. See id. at 8 ("The device
that gives trust its sharpest, most palpable form is promise. By promising we put in another
man's hands a new power to accomplish his will. . . ."); id. at 4 ("[So long as we see contractual
obligation as based on promise, on obligations that the parties have themselves assumed, the
focus of the inquiry is on the will of the parties.") (emphasis added); see also FRIED, supra note
26, at 3 ("[T]he conception of the will binding itself-the conception at the heart of the promise
principle-is neither necessary nor sufficient to contractual obligation.").
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pectations that are deemed desirable, even if not actually created by
the parties-something that traditional will theory has difficulty do-
ing.4 6 Moreover, the notion of interpersonal trust can be viewed as a
basis for the alternative theory based on autonomy of will. This is due
to its axiomatic importance in providing the groundwork for condi-
tions that allow human beings, as "social animals," to forge relation-
ships, attain self-realization, and provide for most of their needs in a
willful way through coordination and cooperation.47
C. Contract Law's Influence (as a Legal Institution) on
Interpersonal Trust (as a Social Convention)
This part will not be complete without a discussion about the impor-
tant question posed by the interrelationship between social norms and
legal norms. More specifically, does contract law provide the basis for
a social culture of trust where it would otherwise be lacking? Implica-
tions of this key question are not limited to the law of contracts, and it
poses a challenge to the status and influence of law within society.
Indeed, contract law provides a degree of certainty that people will
live up to their promises to others. However, motivation to fulfill con-
tractual promises is rooted in external commands (law), rather than
internal sentiment (belief in the other party), which might neutralize
the prospect of authentic trust.48 Moreover, some claim interpersonal
46. Fried himself sometimes has difficulty using his theory to explain American contract law
as actually practiced. The trust theory discussed in this Article, with its "triangle of expecta-
tions," does so in a more harmonious and coherent manner. See, for example, the difficulty
Fried has in discussing unconscionability. In his view, the doctrine of unconscionability has been
applied inconsistently. Id. at 103 ("The decided cases do not invoke the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility in any systematic or even coherent way. Claims of substantive unfairness are mixed with
suggestions of fraud, cognitive deficiency, and duress . . . ."). The triangle-of-expectations test,
which is at the basis of the idea of trust, can be of assistance here as well, for if the capacity to
choose freely is somehow denied, or if the case is one in which economic or other power is being
abused, the subjective expectations of the contracting parties will not be realized, at least not
fully. In such cases, that conclusion will pertain as well to the expectations of the public, which
observes the transaction from behind the "veil of ignorance" and has difficulty identifying with it
because of its expectations regarding the way in which binding contractual promises are gener-
ated within the legal system.
47. BENN & PETERS, supra note 10, at 279; see also Dori Kimel, Neutrality, Autonomy, and
Freedom of Contract, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 473, 482 (2001) ("Personal autonomy is an
ideal of self-creation, of people exerting control over their destinies. An autonomous life con-
sists in their pursuit of freely chosen activities, goals and relationships.").
48. See, e.g., DoRI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACI: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF
CoNTRAcr (2003); Kimel, supra note 47, at 489-93; Dori Kimel, Remedial Rights and Substantive
Rights in Contract Law, 8 LEGAL THEORY 313, 325-28 (2002). For criticism of this position, see
Bellia, supra note 18, and Stephen A. Smith, Performance, Punishment and the Nature of Con-
tractual Obligation, 60 MOD. L. REV. 360, 369 (1997). In this context, doubts can be raised about
the relevance of motive in the process of instilling the idea of trust. In the model proposed by
Kohlberg, who deals with the moral development of the individual, some will fulfill the expecta-
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trust cannot be instilled into contract law because contractual obliga-
tion is grounded in considerations of self-interest while trust is
grounded in the interest of the other. That view is held by Eisenberg,
for example, who assumes that there is difficulty in establishing the
idea of trust in the context of contractual relations. 49 Blair and Stout
too concur, noting that a relationship cannot be based both on trust
and on a contract.50
In response, the institution of contract is indeed rooted in self-inter-
est, but by its very essence, the institution of contract can be realized
only if the reasonable expectations of the other are taken into account
as well. It therefore contemplates, by its very essence, consideration
of the other, even if only for utilitarian reasons. Yet this response is
limited and partial. It is necessary to respond to the more general
criticism-Can the law really promote the establishment of social
norms?
With reference to contract law, this criticism is joined in the litera-
ture with the argument that sees the law of contract as an artificial
alternative to ensure cooperation even when trust, as a cul-
tural-social-psychological concept, is lacking or impaired.51 This crit-
icism is consistent, on the one hand, with the premise advanced in this
Article, according to which contract law and trust share common fea-
tures that are directed toward attaining universal goals of cooperation,
assumption of risks, and fulfillment of reasonable expectations. On
the other hand, however, this Article claims that contract law provides
a powerful mechanism to create mutual influences between the two.
Contract law, despite its legal, sanction-based character, has declara-
tory and motivational roles that cast light on individual commitment.
tions they generated because they fear the sanctions that will ensue if they do not; others may
take account of broader social considerations; while still others may fulfill their promises out of
pure, internal motives. According to this model, the moral development of human beings com-
prises several stages, not all of which are attained by all individuals: moral judgment based on
the external, physical consequences of one's actions, moral judgment based on the social conse-
quences of actions, and moral judgment based on universal moral and ethical principles. See H.
ANDREW MICHENER & JOHN D. DELAMATER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 73 (3d ed. 1994).
49. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contract, and the
Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 835 (1999); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate
Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1274 (1999) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Corporate
Law and Social Norms]. This argument is based on an article by Chapman. Bruce Chapman,
Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONro L.J. 547
(1993) (likewise denying the contractual model of society insofar as it is grounded on the idea of
trust).
50. Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 1780-89.
51. See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 12, at 26, 152; Eisenberg, supra note 5; Kimel, supra note
47, at 490; Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REv. 553, 556 (2001) ("[Liaw substitutes
for rather than complements trust.") (emphasis added).
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In intimate social contexts, indeed, there are extralegal (though not
necessarily sanction-free) cultural mechanisms that act as social glue
and instill the idea of interpersonal trust. In commercial contexts,
however, and in encounters between strangers, contract law serves ex-
actly the same purpose.
There is no substantial difference between the fulfillment of reason-
able expectations derived from the "natural" force of extralegal mech-
anisms, such as morality, reputation, or esteem, or from legal
measures. In either case, varied mechanisms-some of which are co-
ercive and all of which are situated within the bounds of a single cul-
ture and directed towards reinforcing interpersonal trust among
players within the legal system-play a role. Moreover, even if con-
tract law was based upon an external system that compels compliance,
the question of a legal motivator would remain secondary. Addition-
ally, the firm establishment of a socio-legal process that implants a
culture of interpersonal trust will transform artificial incentive into au-
thentic impetus. In sum, many, if not most, contracts are carried out,
and most reasonable contractual expectations are fulfilled, without the
law's involvement (and the fear thereof)-a fact that provides addi-
tional proof of the social force of the contractual institution notwith-
standing its legal origins.
According to Dori Kimel, for example, legal enforceability of con-
tracts weakens the idea of trust as a factor in contractual relations.52
Although he acknowledges that promise (a social institution) and con-
tract (a legal institution) share the same instrumental value since both
encourage and facilitate reliance and cooperation,53 Kimel maintains
that they differ in their intrinsic value. He argues that since the intrin-
sic value of promise lies in its ability to promote interpersonal trust
through its natural fulfillment, the coerced fulfillment of promise di-
minishes the value of trust and impedes the development of interper-
sonal trust-based relationships. 54  Contracts, Kimel continues,
generally lie outside the context of ongoing interpersonal relation-
ships and lack any basis in preexisting relationships of trust between
52. Kimel, supra note 47, at 491 ("[E]nforceability casts a thick and all-encompassing veil over
parties' motives and attitudes towards each other . . . ."). See Smith, supra note 48, at 369, for an
argument similar in effect, explaining that the remedy of enforcement is not the primary remedy
in Anglo-American law, primarily because of the limitations on the law's capacity to create
bonds of trust between the parties to a contract and on its ability to intervene in the life of the
individual.
53. Kimel, supra note 47, at 489.
54. Id. at 491 ("[T]he enforceability of contracts significantly detracts from the practice's abil-
ity to fulfill the kind of intrinsic function that promises fulfill: that of enhancing inter-personal
relationships.").
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the parties. Accordingly, contract law provides a different sort of as-
surance that promises will be fulfilled. In other words, the intrinsic
value of contract law lies precisely in its maintenance of the parties'
personal detachment-the value of being able to undertake activities
with others without thereby becoming committed to personal
relationships.55
Kimel's position is at odds with the thesis that I advance here, for it
regards contract law not only as failing to promote the idea of trust
but also as actually working against it.56 In response, I argue that mo-
tive for fulfilling promises, even in social contexts, is also not
grounded exclusively in purely emotional considerations. Beyond
that, it appears that contracts should be regarded as playing a more
substantial role in forging interpersonal relationships,57 even though
they usually involve practical rather than emotional relationships, par-
ticularly when recognizing the mutual and symbiotic links between so-
cial and legal norms.58
As noted, I maintain that contract law plays a powerful and mul-
tifaceted role-both expressive and coercive-as a legal mechanism.
These roles symbolize and instill a culture of interpersonal trust even,
perhaps mainly, in places where culture is not prevalent. Kimel's ap-
55. Kimel's position has been criticized by Anthony Bellia. Bellia, supra note 18, at 40 ("The
need for individuals to be able to trust that promises will be performed is central to justifying a
law that renders certain promises enforceable. For a law of contract to enforce certain promises
to meet this need is not necessarily to diminish the personal relationships of trust in which they
are made. Rather, the making and performance of legally enforceable promises can assist indi-
viduals in building relationships of trust. The intrinsic value of enforceable promises thus lies
not in their ability to facilitate detachment from personal relationships. The trustworthiness of
promises is valuable to the pursuit of myriad goods, even among friends.").
56. Eisenberg raises a similar argument regarding the significance of enforcing gift contracts
and their negative effect on personal relationships. Even though the claim may be more under-
standable in the socio-legal context of a gift, one legal approach-adopted in Israeli law-condi-
tions the legal force of a gift commitment on its being in writing. In effect, the donor thereby
declares that he is moving from the realm of pure emotional relationships to the realm of legal
obligation. See Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 850.
57. Eisenberg, supra note 26; see also Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges
and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 894-95 (2000).
58. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, supra note 49, at 1269-70 ("While social
norms differ from legal rules, there is often a symbiotic relationship between legal rules and
social norms. On the one hand, legal rules are often based on social norms. On the other hand,
many legal rules have an expressive effect-that is, in addition to their regulatory effects, legal
rules send messages of various kinds. Adoption of a legal rule that is based on a social norm
sends a message that the community regards the norm as especially important. This message
increases both the likelihood that the norm will be internalized and the reputational penalties for
violating the norm. Furthermore, legal rules add, to the force of a specific obligational norm, the
force of the general norm of obedience to law, which is one of the most powerful norms of our
society. Legal rules may also serve to clarify social norms by providing focal points for their
meaning.") (footnote omitted).
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proach is founded on his premise that the idea of trust is, in effect, the
primary one and encompasses the institution of promise in its social
context but not in its contractual one. This view seems to be uncon-
vincing as a promise is a promise is a promise. Certainly, trust and
expectation are, to a degree, circular concepts: Interpersonal trust in-
fluences the expectations that flow from a promise, but the systematic
fulfillment of expectations-including those that flow from a contrac-
tual promise-influences the social, aggregate sense of expectation
and interpersonal trust, especially given that contractual promises are
usually made between strangers.
Accordingly, I find that the social institution of promise is grounded
on the idea of trust as a primary concept that generally characterizes
interpersonal relationships. Contracts, however, generally involve an
encounter between people that usually have no previous social rela-
tionships, and therefore, they cannot rely on a premise of trust flowing
from previous familiarity. Thus, the trust they invoke rests on legal
foundations. Yet, in both cases, social and contractual promises con-
stitute a set of relationships that require interpersonal trust and per-
petuate the sense of trust through fulfillment.
Accordingly, promise draws, in its social sense, on interpersonal
trust while promise, in its legal sense, draws on the existence of con-
tract law. Even if the latter begins by constructing trust in its instru-
mental sense, its role in recurring social interactions and its
application, accompanied by rhetoric of interpersonal trust, eventually
cause it to affect trust in an intrinsic sense. As such, contract law can
be compared to training wheels on a bicycle: training wheels provide
confidence and stability until skills are developed whereas contract
law provides confidence and stability until interpersonal trust is
developed.
I also differ with the claim regarding the lack of affinity between the
idea of trust and the institution of contract from another perspective
that emphasizes not only the "legal" quality of the latter but also the
"psychological" quality of the former. Trust is rooted, first and fore-
most, in the psychological plane, i.e., expectation that certain actions
will occur. This follows from the definition of trust: reliance based
upon A's assessment (internal) that B will act in a particular manner
(external). 59 And given that, A's assessment is situated within the
59. Gambetta, supra note 15, at 217; see also Claire Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive
Theory of Trust 6-14 (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-51, 2005), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=869423.
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emotional-psychological domain and is considered a vital element of
a healthy personality.60
In its external sense, trust reflects social and economic interactions,
for trust leads to cooperative efforts, assumption of risks, and achieve-
ment of better results by minimizing transactional and oversight
costs.61 By playing the "complementary" function of law, 62 contract
law can integrate the same external cooperative goals achieved usually
by the "social norm"63 of trust with the internal-psychological compo-
nent. As an area of law grounded principally in the idea of expecta-
tion and cooperative effort, contract law can act both expressively 64
and coercively (by imposing legal responsibility) 65 to generate an au-
thentic social culture of trust. Law can nurture proper behavior not
only by generating concern about liability and legal "penalties" but
also by implanting cultural norms as discussed by the literature linking
legal norms and extralegal mechanisms that determine proper and im-
proper conduct.66
When all is said and done, a social culture of interpersonal trust
need not grow out of a profound belief in either the high morality of
people or their pure and natural motivation to fulfill the reasonable
expectations held by others. As I have shown elsewhere, law plays an
important role in instilling social values through its practical effect of
imposing legal responsibility and not only through its expressive and
pedagogic qualities.67 That is especially so with contract law, which
transforms the abstract idea of trust into behavioral norms meant to
promote trust, and it does so through expressive and practical mecha-
nisms designed to bear the promisor's, the promisee's, and the public's
reasonable expectations. We now turn to that subject.
60. ERIKSON, supra note 13.
61. See BENN & PETERS, supra note 10.
62. One approach in the literature suggests that law influences trust as an artificial alternative
(the "substitute" function of law). See Ribstein, supra note 51.
63. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, supra note 49 (using the term "social norm
of loyalty").
64. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996).
65. For an approach that views contract law as a coercive means for promoting cooperation,
see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SoCIAL Noims 160 (2000).
66. Cf Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strate-
gic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). For additional references, briefly noted, on the
relationship between legal norms and social norms, see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, De-
velopment, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 338 (1997), and Symposium, Law, Eco-
nomics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1996).
67. Eli Bukspan, The Notion of Trust as a Comprehensive Theory of Contract and Corporate
Law: A New Approach to the Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contract, 2 HAS-
TINGs Bus. L.J. 229, 239-45 (2006).
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III. TRIANGLE-OF-EXPECTATION MODEL
Examination of various doctrines in contract law suggests that inter-
personal trust, in addition to its standing as an ideal, offers the best
descriptive account and explanation for modern contract law, under-
stood in the context of the following principles:
1. The various doctrines within contract law all draw on a broad
social basis68 that needs to be generalized. 69
2. The will and expectation of the promisee, promisor, and the
public are relevant factors as will be claimed in this part.
3. Contract law recognizes not only self-interest but also good
faith, reasonable expectations, and social policy considerations
as will be demonstrated in the next part.
In order to substantiate my claim, the point of departure is a re-
minder of the obvious fact that contracts involve at least two parties,
along with a broad social purpose that affects the general public. 70
Accordingly, and as aforementioned, it is necessary from the outset to
uproot the traditional emphasis given in contract on the promisee's
intention and, even more, on his reliance, which is imprecise and un-
justified. That traditional and mistaken approach is exemplified by
Fuller and Purdue's classic article,7' which played a key role in shifting
the emphasis from the promisor's will to the promisee's reliance on
the promise made to him and to the loss he incurs by reason of that
reliance. This approach is reflected as well in Gilmore's provocative
book on "death of contract" and in Atiyah's account of the rise and
fall of freedom of contract; both works emphasize the promisee's reli-
ance as a condition precedent to the legal validity of the contract.72
68. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1752 ("[D]octrinal propositions can be ultimately justified
only by propositions of morality, policy, and experience."); id. at 1750 ("[T]he premise of sub-
stantive legal reasoning is that doctrinal propositions are not autonomous from social proposi-
tions."); id. at 1753 ("In contrast to the formal reasoning of classical contract law, modern
contract law reasoning is substantive. That is, modem contract law seeks to justify doctrines on
the basis of social propositions. Of course, doctrines have a role to play in substantive legal
reasoning, but that is because of the social values that underlie doctrinal stability, not because
doctrines are either self-evident or established by deduction."); id. at 1813 ("Where classical
contract law employed reasoning that purported to be axiomatic and deductive, modern contract
law employs reasoning that is explicitly grounded in social propositions.").
69. This ambition rests on the metaphor of Hercules, the "super-judge" depicted by Dworkin
as dealing with the "theory" that suits and justifies most private-law arrangements. Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1094 (1975) ("[A theory] must construct a scheme
of abstract and concrete principles that provides a coherent justification for all common law
precedents and .. . constitutional and statutory provisions as well.").
70. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. Rav. 553 (1933).
71. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 29.
72. GRArT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CofrRAcr (1974); see also P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTR.AcT (1979). In later writings, Atiyah acknowledged that reli-
ance, in itself, cannot justify imposing liability on the party relied on, and that it is necessary to
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However, the various doctrines related to contract-offer and ac-
ceptance, mistake and deception, rules of invalid contracts, laws re-
lated to contractual content, and laws governing remedies for
breach-are concerned not only with the will and expectation of the
promisee but also with those of the other party (the promisor) and the
public,73 such that a three-dimensional perspective is much better
suited to understanding the contractual interaction. As a mechanism
for the exchange of promises, the contract is, by its nature, a mutual
legal and social instrument, and it follows that its purpose goes far
beyond the realization of a single expectation.
We can therefore refer to the new suggested model for contract law
as one that follows the triangle of expectations:
1. Expectations of the promisee (also a promisor when promises
are mutual);
2. Expectations of the promisor (also a promisee when promises
are mutual);
3. Expectations of the law-abiding public that witnesses the prom-
ise with regards to ensuring the fulfillment of the reasonable
expectations of the parties.
The test is simple, and it offers a consistent and accurate prediction
of the legal order embodied in statutory provisions or court determi-
nations of contractual disputes, which endeavor to instill a culture of
trust. In contrast, an exclusive focus on the promisee's expectations
generally fails to explain a statute's complexities or the spontaneous
motivation for court decisions in contract cases. It may also detract
from the reciprocal and social essence woven into the contract and
from the mission of the contractual institution to advance one's egotis-
tical interests together with the reasonable expectations of the other. 74
refer to conventional social values to decide which expectations and which sorts of reliance war-
rant legal protection. It is the law, not the parties, that must determine which expectations are
reasonable and entitled to protection. See P. S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 36 (5th ed. 1995); P. S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAw 68 (1981). In these
later works, one can see support, albeit indirect, for the thesis advanced in the present Article,
maintaining that contract law deals as well-and perhaps primarily-with the protection of justi-
fied expectations, in contrast to subjective ones.
73. For examples in the various doctrines of Israeli law, see ELI BUKSPAN, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS LAw (2007) [in Hebrew].
74. The triangle-of-expectations test, and especially the component concerned with the expec-
tations of the public, emphasizes the interpersonal relationship, the need for cooperation, and
the contract process going forward. In that way, the triangle of expectations introduces a dy-
namic dimension to the contractual process, making it into one that creates an ongoing social
relationship. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1813-14 ("The paradigm at the center of classical
contract law was a snapshot taken at the moment a bargain was made. In contrast, modern
contract law recognizes that contract is a process, so that the picture we see at the time of con-
tract formation, however important, is only one of a series of frames. Unless contract law re-
sponds to the whole moving picture, it cannot capture the reality of contract.").
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The contractual institution is based on an exchange of voluntary
promises and the formation of reciprocal expectations. It follows that
the laws of contract must attend, first and foremost, to the subjective
expectations of the contracting parties. At the same time, by recog-
nizing (sometimes different) expectations of two or more parties, con-
tract law must be subjected as well to the additional objective and
pragmatic test of public expectations.75 This "aggregated" analysis-
filtering the parties' expectations with those of the public-maintains
the social standing of the contractual institution and contributes to the
coordination of various expectations involved in each contract. In ad-
dition, it reflects the hypothetical expectations of the "consumers of
contract law," the people whose lives are guided by the law, regarding
the desired behavior of the parties to the contractual relation and the
legitimacy of contractual obligations.76
In other words, the third element of the triangle of expectations
centers on the public's expectations and provides a harmonious and
integrative account of how and why contract law is subjected to objec-
tive tests and to fundamental social principles that are assimilated into
contractual interactions. Thus, it structures desirable interpersonal
expectations within the legal system. No one denies that contract law,
especially in its modern form, increasingly protects a party's subjective
expectations, but it also protects normative and objective expecta-
tions, which are accordingly termed a "reasonable expectation" or a
"proper expectation."77 While the examination of the promisor's and
promisee's expectations is a "private" and subjective matter, the pub-
75. See Mautner, supra note 22, at 558 ("The fact that contract-making serves as a functional
equivalent of trust provides an additional explanation for the rise of the objective approach in
contract law."); see also POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL, supra note 30, at 226; cf Mautner, supra note
22, at 553-59 (suggesting that the objective approach in contract law be explained in light of the
sociological concept of trust).
76. The third component of the triangle-of-expectations model-the public expectations-
matches Mitchell's proposal to view the concept of trust from the perspective of a reasonable
person. Mitchell, supra note 33, at 194. Thus, the triangle-of-expectation model might improve
the ideal function of contract law in advancing trust even in Mitchell's eyes. Id. at 205 ("In order
for the law to be effective, the legal structure reinforcing trust must set forth principles which are
both reasonable and ascertainable. Ideally, these principles will lead members of society to in-
ternalize the principles of trust such that they are instilled as a central part of each individual's
value system. In order for trust to reach this level, it must be based on principles which are
attainable by the mass of its members."). On the importance of the public's identification with
the legal norm, see Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585
(1998). See also H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 79-88 (1961).
77. Cf CORIN, supra note 35, § 1.1 ("The law does not attempt the realization of every ex-
pectation that has been induced by a promise; the expectation must be a reasonable one. Under
no system of law that has ever existed are all promises enforceable. The expectation must be one
that most people would have; and the promise must be one that most people would perform.").
For additional authorities supporting the view that the community, in determining the obliga-
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lic's expectations are subjected to normative examinations-What can
be reasonably expected of one's fellow? The answer to this question
allows us to outline the bounds of "freedom of promise"78 or "free-
dom of expectation." In taking account of the public's expectations,
the law looks at contractual interaction as an "iterated game" and
tests the extent to which the public, situated behind the "veil of igno-
rance," identifies with the parties' expectations.
The third element of the triangle of expectations also examines the
public's expectations with respect to the functioning and standing of
the contractual institution in establishing interpersonal trust within
the legal system. As such, the public's expectations can sometimes be
paramount, not only in cases where the expectations of the promisor
and of the promisee differ but also in cases where the parties' expecta-
tions are identical yet inconsistent with the proper and reasonable ex-
pectations of the public.79 In that way, the public understanding of
contract law becomes evident, as does its central role, bearing on the
most common interpersonal interactions. Taking account of the pub-
lic's expectations makes it easier for the public to identify with the
contractual institution and the expectations it protects, and it provides
practical advantages of serving as a decisional rule that may apply in
the frequent cases in which the parties' subjective expectations are in
conflict. That standard encourages the players in the legal system to
take account of others and to carefully consider how they present
their understanding of the contract and its surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances, and how their behavior is received by the public. In do-
ing so, they strengthen the standing of interpersonal trust as a social
idea underlying the contractual relationship.
As a practical matter, consideration of the triangle of expectations
is already implied by the definition of the term "promise," which
forms the basis of contract in American jurisprudence. Section 1 of
the Restatement of Contracts defines contract as follows: "A contract is
a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty."80 Section 2(1) of the Restatement defines promise as fol-
tions to be enforced, takes account of its goals and values and does not simply honor, in a neutral
manner, the undertakings of the contracting parties, see FRIED, supra note 26, at 3.
78. A term borrowed from Fried. FRIED, supra note 26, at 35.
79. See FARNswoRTH, supra note 2, § 7.9; cf Steyn, supra note 37, at 434 ("The law does not
protect unreasonable expectations. It protects only expectations which satisfy an objective crite-
rion of reasonableness. ... [R]easonableness postulates community values. It refers not to the
standards of Lord Eldon's day. It is concerned with contemporary standards not of moral phi-
losophers but of ordinary right thinking people.").
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
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lows: "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from
acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in under-
standing that a commitment has been made."8
According to Section 2(1), a promise is manifestation of intention to
act or refrain from acting in a certain way (expressing the expectations
of the promisor), so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that
a commitment has been made (expressing both the expectations of the
promisee and of the public observing the interaction). 82 The phrase
"so made as to justify" and the requirement for a "manifestation of
intention" suggest that in the Restatement the test used in finding lia-
bility applies an external and objective standard for interpreting be-
havior rather than a standard focused on intention and internal
expectation. The Restatement, thus, looks to the way in which the
promise is understood by the public-and not necessarily at the sub-jective understanding of the promisor or the promisee-as the stan-
dard for determining whether the expectation under consideration
should be considered a contractual promise.83
A more extensive definition of a promise, one that further sharpens
the components of the triangle-of-expectations test, is provided by
Corbin:
A promise is an expression of commitment to act in a specified way,
or to bring about a specified result in the future, or to take responsi-
bility that the result has occurred or will occur, communicated in
such a way that the addressee of the expression may justly expect per-
formance and may reasonably rely thereon.84
Like the definition in the second Restatement, and as implied by the
terms "justly expect" and "reasonably rely," this definition also af-
fords decisional standing to the expectations of the public, which ob-
serves-metaphorically, whether by passively witnessing contractual
interactions or by learning of them through court opinions-the
"commitment" and assesses whether the promisee's expectations and
reliance on it are just and reasonable. Moreover, the use of the term
"commitment" and the requirement that the promisor express and
communicate it emphasize his own expectations, not only the expecta-
tions and reliance of the promisee. 85
81. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Cf id. § 2 cmt. b.
84. CoRBNm, supra note 35, § 1.13 (emphasis added).
85. The need to examine the expectations of the promisor as a central component of the
contractual promise is implied as well by Corbin. Id. ("If a person has reason to know that his
or her words or other conduct may reasonably cause another to believe that a promise is being
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The triangle of expectations is taken into account in another key
provision-perhaps, indeed, the pivotal provision-of the Restate-
ment, that is, section 90(1):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injus-
tice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The rem-
edy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.86
The attitude toward the promisor's expectations is reflected in the
passage, "which the promisor should reasonably expect;" the prom-
isee's expectations are reflected in the passage, "which does induce
such action or forbearance;" and the public's expectations can be re-
vealed in the passage, "if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited
as justice requires." Also pertinent in that regard is the word "reason-
ably" with respect to the promisor, as it appears at the beginning of
the section. According to section 90, only the confluence of these
three components generates a contractual event, grounded in consid-
eration of the expectations and reliance of the three agents involved in
the contractual interaction. The confluence of the three components
also highlights the fact that, in this section as well, it is the promise, as
the source of reliance, that is primary.87
IV. PUBLIC POLICY, THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH, AND THE
OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT
A. Public Policy
The principle of freedom of contract rests on the conventional pre-
mise that enforcement of the parties' agreement is consistent with the
made and such belief actually results, a promise has been made even though the speaker or
writer of the words does not intend to convey such a meaning.").
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1). Section 90 has been described as a
"most notable and influential rule," FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 2.19 (emphasis added), and as
"perhaps the most radical and expansive development of this century in the law of promissory
liability." See Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Prom-
issory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 52, 53 (1981).
87. In this context, it is worth noting the argument of Yorio and Thel, who remark that this
section is concerned-as is all of contract law-with protecting promises and not with the tort-
related idea of reliance. Yorio & Thel, supra note 17, at 167 ("Like the rest of contract law,
Section 90 is about promises. . . . Section 90 has greatly expanded the scope of civil liability in
twentieth-century American law. Contrary to received wisdom, that expansion has occurred in
the contractual context of promise rather than the tort-related context of reliance. Far from
evidencing the death of contract, the application of Section 90 by the courts demonstrates that
promise is more vital than ever."); id. at 130 ("That courts enforce promises rather than compen-
sate reliance under Section 90 is powerful evidence that the basis of the section in the courts is
promise.").
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public interest. That said, a court can determine that the parties' au-
tonomy must yield to another interest and thus invalidate a contract in
whole or in part.88 Public policy is determined by the application of
principles embodied in precedent developed over the years-princi-
ples that change over time as the public interest evolves. Such
changes are evident with respect to moral values, such as policies sup-
porting family lifestyles or those against gambling; they may also be
evident with respect to economic views or other matters.89
The public policy principle, emanating from its very name that em-
phasizes the public rather than the contractual parties, poses signifi-
cant theoretical difficulties for the will theory as a basis for contract
law, perhaps more than any other contractual doctrine. But the ap-
proach suggested herein, interpersonal trust, promoted by the triangle
of expectations, provides a consistent explanation for the integrative
and harmonizing role of this principle in the framework of contract
law.
An examination of this principle suggests that public policy has
been used to justify the triangle-of-expectations test, especially in light
of its third component pertaining to the public's expectations. This
component aims to enlist contract law as a mechanism for structuring
ideal expectations.
The public policy principle ensures the invalidity of a contract that
is unlawful, immoral, or otherwise contrary to public policy. That re-
sult establishes the legal system's limits on legitimate promises and
expectations, as well as the place of the contractual institution in the
overall social tapestry. This, in turn, means that voiding contract pro-
visions is not necessarily a departure from contract law. On the con-
trary, because contractual interaction draws on consideration of the
other's expectations, considering the basic principles of the system as
part of the parties' expectations is not foreign. In this way, interper-
sonal trust and trust in the contractual institution are strengthened
more than they would be under an approach that zealously empha-
sizes the place of promises within the legal system. From a different
perspective, this principle promotes the establishment of a human and
88. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 5.1. For a description of cases in which the public policy
principle was applied as well as for an economic analysis of this principle, see Note, A Law and
Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1445 (2006).
89. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 5.2. In Israeli law, it has been said that it is not for naught
that the public policy provision of the Israeli Law of Contracts, as a common-law system, has
been described as "a primary legal instrumentality-together with other principles, such as good
faith-as a means by which overall harmony within the legal system is ensured. It is the main
instrument that reflects 'the basis of the social order."' CA 294/91 Jerusalem Cmty. Burial Soc'y
v. Kestenbaum 46(2) PD 464, 1 22 [1992] (Isr.) (Barak, J.).
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social culture that protects expectation and trust in the broad sense by
making transparent the expectations of the contractual player situated
behind the veil of ignorance.
In that player's view, promises whose formation, content, or goals
run counter to law, morality, or public policy endanger the very un-
derpinnings of society and the institution of the contract that draws on
them. It follows that the law of contract itself justly sets the limits of
freedom to contract, as well as the limits of proper expectations within
the legal system. 90
The principle of public policy is one of the key concepts that affects
the assimilation of interpersonal trust into contract law and the pro-
motion of the fulfillment of individual expectations alongside those of
the other and of the public. As noted, the principle is primarily con-
cerned with the realization of ideal expectations, not only real ones.
This doctrine "breaks" the circularity that seems to exist between trust
and expectation. Indeed, fulfilling an improper expectation has the
potential to undermine the idea of interpersonal trust and of trust in
the institution of contract. It is, therefore, easy to justify the place of
public policy within the law of contract and its call for examining the
propriety of expectations rather than enforcing every subjective ex-
pectation.91 Doing so promotes expectations and trust not only within
the contractual context but also within the social system, including its
constituents and the interpersonal relationships that exist within it.
Notwithstanding the preferred place of the public's expectations
within the framework of the principle of public policy, the laws gov-
erning invalid contracts do not neglect the other sides of the triangle
of expectations-those that pertain to the subjective expectations of
the parties to the invalid contract. The court need not invalidate and
decline to enforce an entire contract because of provisions that run
counter to public policy. It is free to decide that the contract must be
performed by only one of the parties to it or that only part of the
contract will be enforced, taking into account the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties, the public interest that might be impaired by en-
forcement of the contract in full, and the reliance of the parties.92
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2)(a) ("In weighing the interest in the
enforcement of a term, account is taken of the parties' justified expectations . . . .") (emphasis
added).
91. This is similar to the goals of the good-faith provisions of the Israeli Law of Contracts as
construed in Gans v. British & Colonial Co. CA 2643/97 Gans v. British & Colonial Co. 57(2)
PD 385, 1 15 [2003] (Isr.) (Barak, J.) ("[B]ehavior is in good faith if it is consistent with the
'proper moral standards of [Israeli] society, as the Court understands them from time to time."')
(citation omitted).
92. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 5.1.
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While the public policy principle creates an objective-normative ex-
amination of the public interest, it also considers the parties' authentic
expectations as implied in section 78 of the Restatement of Contracts.93
In other words, the public policy principle forms a synthesis that takes
into account simultaneously the full array of expectations involved in
the contractual interaction-those of the parties and those of the pub-
lic. In that way, the two-fold-or, as a practical matter, three-fold-
purpose of the public policy principle is fulfilled. The rules pertaining
to invalid contracts thereby illustrate the way in which the triangle of
expectations is taken into account, even though they afford prece-
dence to the public's expectations in view of their primary role in in-
culcating just and reasonable expectations.
B. Principle of Good Faith
The central claim of this Article-that contract law strives to con-
cretize the idea of interpersonal trust by means of the triangle of ex-
pectations created by each contractual promise-is clearly implicit vis-
A-vis the principle of good faith. The principle of good faith, provided
for in section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts,94 is an important
focus of contract law.95 Farnsworth had good reason for noting that
"[t]he concept of good faith has, in a relatively few decades, become
one of the peculiarly American cornerstones of our common law of
contracts" and has accomplished a "reformulation of traditional
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178.
94. Id. § 205 & cmt. a, d ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.") (emphasis added).
95. The principle is well-known in other legal systems as well. See GOOD FAITH AND FAULT
IN CONTRACT LAW (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000); R. HARRISON, GOOD
FAITH IN SALES (1997). For a comprehensive discussion of the case for and against this princi-
ple, see ROGER BROWNSWORD, CONTRACT LAW: THEMES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
111-34 (2d ed. 2006). In Israel, for example, the application is prescribed by Articles 12 and 39
of the Israeli Law of Contracts and, more recently, by Article 2 of the Draft Bill Civil Law
Codification. Draft Bill Civil Law Codification, 2011, HH 712 (Isr.); in its first chapter of the
Draft Bill, which examines basic principles, it states: "In exercising a right, in taking legal action,
and in fulfilling a duty, one must act in good faith." Id. On the rationale for these provisions,
see CA 207/79 Raviv Moshe Partners Ltd. v. Beit Yulis Ltd. 37(1) PD 533, 543-44 [1982] (Isr.)
("This directive [of section 12 of the Law of Contracts] imposes special 'relationships of trust' on
those taking part in contractual negotiation and contractual trust, whose source is in § 39 of the
Law of Contracts, is thereby extended beyond the pre-contractual stage... . This duty to con-
duct negotiations in the usual course and with good faith means that the negotiators are bound
to act toward one another honestly and fairly. They are no longer 'strangers' to each other;
rather, the law creates an affinity between them that generates expectations and imposes a duty
of consideration.").
408 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 11:379
law." 96 This is so much the case that it is no longer possible to escape
the conclusion that the idea of trust and the triangle of expectations
pervade the contractual institution, especially while taking into ac-
count that the good faith principle "[s]ets an objective standard, vis.,
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the conclusion and performance of the transaction concerned." 97
1. During Negotiation
Negotiation invokes a willful social interaction (and, impliedly, a
consensual one) in the formation of an agreed-upon arrangement.
Because of these characteristics, the negotiation stage bears on the
parties' expectations, on the character of their future interactions if
the negotiations bear fruit and a contract is formed, and on similar
interactions in future negotiations. In other words, already at the ne-
gotiation stage-the stage at which the parties are invited to extend
interpersonal trust to one another-the crystallization and shaping of
the parties' wills, consciousnesses, and expectations have substantial
significance. The principle of good faith in pre-contractual negotia-
tions is not directly dealt with by section 205 of the Restatement of
Contracts and section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Still,
bad faith in negotiation, although not within the scope of this section,
may be subject to sanctions.98 Some comparative examples from
Israel illustrate the effort made by contract law to instill the idea of
interpersonal trust both on the expressive plane and with respect to its
sanction, i.e., remedies for breach.
Article 12 of the Israeli Law of Contract provides as follows:
(a) In negotiating a contract, a person will act in customary man-
ner and in good faith.
(b) A party who does not act in customary manner and in good
faith will be liable to pay compensation to the other party for
the damage caused to him in consequence of the negotiations
or of the conclusion of the contract. 99
96. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 7.17b. For a detailed description of the principle of good
faith in the American law, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Performance, in
GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 95, at 153.
97. ROGER BROWNSWORD, SMITH & THOMAS: A CASEBOOK ON CONTRACT 54 (12th rev. ed.
2009). Viewing the principle from a different angle, "duties not explicitly assumed by the parties
may be imposed if required by good faith. . . . [I]t seems as if contractual relations depend not
on the will of the parties but on externally imposed substantive moral judgments of what the
relations between the parties should be." FRIED, supra note 26, at 75; see also BRowNswoRD,
supra note 95. at 129 ("[The good-faith principle] can contribute to a culture of trust and cooper-
ation . . . .").
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c.
99. Article 12 of Contract Law, 5733-1973, 694 LSI 118 (1973) (Isr.).
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A review of the court decisions concerning Article 12 shows that the
provision is grounded less in will and intention and more in interper-
sonal trust and its derivatives (such as the duty to disclose and the
requirement of cooperation), which color the expectations of those
involved in the contractual interaction. In Fenider, the court noted:
"Article 12 . . . is founded in the relationship of trust, which must
prevail among the parties conducting negotiations in anticipation of
executing a contract."100 In another decision, the former President of
the High Court, Judge Shamgar, stated:
It appears that there is a close connection between the concept of
trust and the legal concept of good faith. Both concepts are based
on the same underlying idea. The sociological concept of trust has,
at its foundation, the ability of each individual to rely on the fulfill-
ment of his reasonable expectation that another individual or an
institution will act in accord with the obligations suggested by their
situation or their role. The legal concept of good faith has, at its
foundation, the ability of each individual to rely on the fulfillment
of his reasonable expectation regarding his legal relationship to
another.10
As a practical matter, trust-dealt with by contract law in general
and the principle of good faith in particular-implies consideration of
the triangle of expectations. "Good faith tries to ensure that this con-
cern is treated in a fair manner, taking account of the just expectations
of the other party and ensuring the parties' shared endeavor." 102
Even though the principle of good faith is a normative and objective
principle formulated as an open-ended standard, its application in-
volves a "normative concretization" that examines each transaction
and its individual circumstances, probing the dynamic expectations of
the participants and seeking their attainment. That normative concre-
tization grows out of the pre-contractual triangle-of-expectations test,
and the idea of trust is thereby realized as a social value promoted by
contract law. Courts generally attempt to advance this goal by treat-
ing the duty to disclose as part of the duty to act in good faith.
100. CA 230/80 Fenider Inv., Dev. & Constr. Co. v. Castro 35(2) PD 713, 724 [1981] (Isr.). For
additional references on the subject, see id. at 725 and FH 7/81 Fenider Inv., Dev. & Constr. Co.
v. Castro 37(4) PD 673, 690, 703 [1983] (Isr.).
101. CA 3912/90 Eximin SA v. Itel Style Ferarri Textiles & Shoes Ltd. 47(4) PD 64, 83 [1993]
(Isr.).
102. FH 22/82 Beit Yules v. Raviv 43(1) PD 441, 484 [1989] (Isr.); CA 6370/00 Kal Binyan v.
A.R.M. Rananah Bldg. & Leasing, Ltd. 56(3) PD 289, 298 [2002] (Isr.) ("What this means is that
those engaged in negotiations in contemplation of executing a contract, and the parties to the
contractual relationship after the contract has been executed, are to act fairly and in a manner
that takes account of the reasonable expectations of the other party.").
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The duty to disclose is the key duty that courts read into the princi-
ple of good faith, for it bears directly on the idea of interpersonal trust
and the sincerity, mutuality, and expectation involved in the contrac-
tual interaction. Legal rhetoric justifies interposing the duty to dis-
close, with all its implications, into the sense of fairness, the
atmosphere of trust between the parties to the negotiation, the fulfill-
ment of their reasonable expectations, and the manner in which they
understand the pros and cons of their encounter and the range of pos-
sibilities open to them.103
The duty to disclose, which makes it possible to protect the expecta-
tions of parties involved in negotiations, receives an even more promi-
nent status due to the imbalance of power between the parties. In
such situations, the Israeli courts pay special attention to the objective
and normative aspects of the public's expectations, striving to prevent
more powerful contracting parties that are very common these days-
most prominently, banks and insurance companies-from taking ad-
vantage of the trust placed in them (or that ought to be placed in
them) by the parties that typically contract with them, who generally
are economically weaker and have less access to information. Thus,
greater social responsibility is cast on corporations, especially financial
corporations:
In Israel, the starting point with respect to the duty to disclose is
different, and the general approach is that the duty to disclose rou-
tinely attaches to those about to enter into a contract, even in the
absence of special relationships of trust; rather, it arises by force of
the trust that is formed between the negotiating parties. . . . The
bank is bound by a duty to disclose substantive matters to its cus-
tomers by force of the duties of trust imposed on it, which go be-
yond the duties borne by parties to an ordinary contract.104
This duty of faithfulness, imposed on the bank as a commercial cor-
poration, is warranted by the public's real and ideal expectations:
The set of relationships between a customer . . . and a bank is a
special set of relationships, flowing from the broader public's trust
103. CA 230/80 Fenider Inv., Dev. & Constr. Co. v. Castro 35(2) PD 713, 724 [1981] (Isr.)
("The duty to negotiate in the customary manner and in good faith is a general duty from which
there naturally follow concrete duties that depend on the particular circumstances of the
case... . One of the duties generally imposed is the duty to disclose information about those
matters concerning which the receipt of information is likely to be important in deciding whether
or not to enter into a contractual relationship. .. . In that regard, a person involved in negotia-
tions for the sale of property bears the duty to disclose to the other party that the property does
not yet belong to the seller, or that someone else has certain rights to it. That information is
important to the other party, for it bears directly on his deliberations over whether and on what
conditions to enter into the contract."); see also FH 7/81 Fenider Inv., Dev. & Constr. Co. v.
Castro 37(4) PD 673, 690, 703 [1983] (Isr.).
104. CA 5893/91 Tefabot Isr. Mortg. Bank Ltd. v. Tsavah 48(2) PD 573, 596 [1994] (Isr.).
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in that institution. The bank and its officers are regarded by the
public as endowed with professional authority, in part because of
their possession of information that is inaccessible to the general
public; moreover, the bank, as a financial institution, has unique ca-
pabilities and can employ technical methods that are beyond the
reach of individuals. All of this allows the bank to avoid damage to
its customers, while the potential injured party lacks any such capac-
ity. Because the individual in many cases has a sense of greater
trust in the bank, believing in its capabilities and technical methods
and seeing it as a quasi-public institution, he sometimes is inclined
not to take precautions and not to anticipate possible harm even if
he has the means to do so.... By virtue of these special relation-
ships, the bank has special duties, duties not imposed on parties to
an ordinary contract.105
2. Vis-A-Vis Contractual Performance and the
Triangle of Expectations
The principle of good faith, formulated as a positive duty,106 clearly
rests on the basis of consideration of the three players in the contrac-
tual process-the promisor, the promisee, and the public:
Good faith presumes that one possessed of a right is concerned
about protecting the right. At the same time, good faith seeks to
avoid exercising the right in a way that disregards the existence of
the other party and of society's interests. . .. The principle of good
faith means that in protecting one's self-interest, one must act fairly
and must take account of the justly held expectations of the other
party and its reasonable acts of reliance. It does not require the
parties to be angels toward one another. It is meant to prevent a
situation of homo homini lupus. It seeks to introduce a normative
framework whereby homo homini-homo.107
The affinity between the principle of good faith and the idea of trust
is expressed not only in the rhetoric accompanying its application,
which adopts a "mediating" and integrative philosophy, but also in
how it is applied, touching on the fulfillment of the parties' real and
justified expectations, especially by insisting on the duties to disclose
and to cooperate. This rhetoric and application provide an example of
the simultaneously "coercive" and "expressive" roles of the law in in-
stilling a culture of trust in interpersonal relationships. 0 8 However,
especially in the context of the principle of good faith, law also has a
105. Id. at 585. To similar effect, with respect to an insurance company, see CA 4819/92
Eliyahu v. Yesher 49(2) PD 749, 765 [1995] (Isr.).
106. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 7.17 ("[Tlhe duty may not only proscribe undesirable con-
duct, but may require affirmative action as well.").
107. Compare CA 2643/97 Gans v. British & Colonial Co. 57(2) PD 385, 400-01 [2003] (Isr.),
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
108. See HART, supra note 76, at 79-88; Cooter, supra note 76; McAdams, supra note 66.
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significant expressive, educational, and "hortatory" role. Court deci-
sions dealing with the principle of good faith in contractual perform-
ance often include incisive declarations regarding the inherent
relations of trust that are formed in the penumbra of contractual rela-
tions. For example:
The duty to fulfill a contractual obligation in good faith and in the
customary manner means that the parties to the contractual rela-
tionship are bound to act justly and fairly to each other, in accord
with customary practice among upright contracting parties. To be
sure, the parties need not behave as angels toward each other, but
neither may they act as wolves.... All parties to a contract bear the
duty to cooperate with one another and to act in a way that takes
account of their shared interest in the contract. The contracting
parties must act to realize their shared intention, faithfully and with
dedication to the goal they envisioned and with consistency in real-
izing their reasonable shared expectations. Indeed, had the terms
"trust," "faith" and "faithfulness" not been used, it would have
been possible to describe the set of relationships formed between
the contracting parties . . . as relationships of faithfulness, such that
a contracting party has the duty to carry out the contract faithfully,
by realizing the trust placed in him by the other party .... 109
C. Objective Theory of Contractual Assent
The formation of a contract depends on the existence of an offer
and an acceptance as indications for mutual assent.110 More precisely,
109. HCJ 59/80 Beer-Sheba Pub. Transp. Servs. Ltd. v. Nat'l Labour Court 53(1) PD 828, 834
[1980] (Isr.). In Chapter 6 of his book on contracts as a promise, discussing the principle of good
faith, Fried writes that the doctrine of good faith is regarded as a particular challenge to the idea
of contract as promise, inasmuch as the promise embodied in the contract often fails to define
sufficiently the relationships between the parties. FRIED, supra note 26, at 74 ("The most direct
challenge to the conception of contract law as a coherent expression of the principle of auton-
omy is thought to come from the doctrines of good faith, unconscionability, and duress. These
doctrines explicitly authorize courts in the name of fairness to revise contractual arrangements
or to overturn them altogether. Good faith is a way of dealing with a contractual party: honestly,
decently.. . . Duress is a vice inhering in the pressure used to procure the agreement, while
unconscionability refers to a vice in the agreement itself.") (footnote omitted). In the view set
forth in this Article, however, the principle of good faith is entirely consistent with contract law,
drawing on its general drive to fulfill the triangle of expectations of the players involved in the
contract. Compare Fried's treatment of the contrast between Belmont and Venice in Shake-
speare's Merchant of Venice. The two locales represent divergent attitudes to the law of con-
tract; Belmont is a regime of love and familial relationships while Venice is a place of commerce
that insists on the literal performance of agreements. Fried believes that it is possible to inte-
grate the realms. Id. at 90-91 ("Nor in commercial relations is there any imperative that con-
tractual partners refuse to share. In fact there are many motives for such sharing in most
commercial contexts: from the desire to maintain goodwill so that relations will continue into the
future, to a genuinely altruistic concern for one's fellow man, customer, or business partner.
Nothing in the liberal concept of contract, nothing in the liberal concept of humanity and law
makes such altruism improbable or meaningless.").
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22.
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the typical offer is, in effect, a proposed promise or a promise condi-
tioned on a reciprocal promise.' The requirement for congruence
between the elements of the offer and those of the acceptance ensures
the shared interpersonal relationship that develops between the par-
ties, as well as the mutual, social, and voluntary character of the con-
tractual interaction. 112  Only the congruence of the parties'
expectations makes the contractual expectation legally valid and con-
tractually binding on both parties.
These requirements 13 test not only the existence of subjective ex-
pectations held by the parties themselves but also the expectations of
the public who relies on the institution of contract. In that way, the
triangle-of-expectations test is carried out in full: an offeror must out-
wardly present the offeree with a proposal reflecting her intent to in-
cur an obligation in a concrete manner. In that way, contract law
ensures that the offeror expected (and not merely intended) for her
proposal to lead to the conclusion of a contract. The requirement of
acceptance, for its part, ensures not only the conditions for realizing
the offeror's expectation that a contract be formed on the terms she
expected but also the realization of the offeree's expectation that she,
too, be bound by the contract. It follows that the requirement of con-
gruence between acceptance and offer and their public nature ensures
that the mutual expectations are fully developed and known to all par-
ties that rely on the contractual institution.
These requirements focus on the integration of the shared expecta-
tions of the parties to the contractual process and confer with the pub-
lic's expectations of the manner in which contracts are formed. The
public's expectations, however, acquire a more concrete and indepen-
dent dimension when there is no subjective meeting of expectations;
in that case, the public's expectations require testing the formation of
a contract by means of objective, external tests of reasonableness.1 1 4
111. Cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 1.1.
112. See FRIED, supra note 26, at 45 ("Promises-and therefore contracts-are fundamentally
relational; one person must make the promise to another, and the second person must accept
it."); see also Macneil, supra note 26, at 901; cf Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 816-17.
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 cmt. b ("As is made clear in Chapter
3, particularly §§ 17-20, the intention of a party that is relevant to formation of a contract is the
intention manifested by him rather than any different undisclosed intention."); cf id. §§ 17-20
(stating that the intention of the parties that is relevant to the formation of a contract is the
external, manifest intention, not the inner one).
114. On the origin of the term "meeting of the minds," see E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in
the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943-44 (1967). The classic statement of the objective
view is that of Learned Hand in Hotchkiss. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293
(S.D.N.Y. 1911).
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The elements of offer and acceptance apparently ensure that both
the offeror and the offeree expect to become contractually bound and
that both sides consider their obligations in this regard. Yet because
the contract is a basic social "product" on which society and com-
merce depend, the relevant sections have been interpreted as directed
at the subjective expectations of the parties and the expectations of
the public related to the process of contract formation. In that way,
the "private" contract is subjected, from the outset, to the so-
cial-public aims of contract law. The requirement for external mani-
festation of the offer and acceptance is meant to ensure that there is
an indication of the subjective intentions and expectations of the par-
ties. But given the decisive weight assigned in case law to this external
manifestation of intent (even in cases where the subjective expecta-
tion of one of the parties differs), there appears to be no escaping the
conclusion that the laws governing contractual formation have their
center of gravity located more in public and normative rationales than
in private, subjective ones.115
Hence, the objective-extrinsic approach to examining contract for-
mation has become the dominant one. 16 Adoption of this standard
implies a legal policy that directs legal players to take account of the
other and the manner in which their postures are understood by the
public; it follows that the idea of interpersonal trust is the social idea
on which the formation of a contract is based. Therefore, the triangle-
of-expectations test is more useful than the will theory of contract in
justifying and explaining the routine use of an objective standard for
examining the formation of a contract, for by the nature of things, the
will theory is less accepting of the objective-extrinsic standard than is
the idea of trust." 7
115. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 7.9 ("Since a contract involves two parties, however, the
search for meaning begins with the meaning attached by both parties to the contract language;
each needs the other's assent. . . . The reader should look with some skepticism on the judicial
commonplace that in interpreting a contract the court merely carries out 'the intentions of the
parties.' The court does indeed carry out their intention in those relatively rare cases in which
the parties attached the same meaning to the language in question. But if the parties attached
different meanings to that language, the court's task is the more complex one of applying a
standard of reasonableness to determine which party's intention is to be carried out at the ex-
pense of the other's. And if the parties attached no meaning to that language, its task is to find
by a standard of reasonableness a meaning that does not accord with any intention at all.")
(footnote omitted).
116. Id. § 3.9 ("The objective theory is today so widely and unquestioningly accepted as pro-
tecting the reasonable expectations of the parties . . . .").
117. This claim can be nicely illustrated by an Israeli contract-law case. CA 1548/96 Bank
Iggud Le-Yisrael v. Lupo 54(2) PD 559 [2000] (Isr.) (discussing reliance as part of the objective
tests regarding contract formation). In this case, the mortgaged property consisted of both a
residential building and the land on which it was built-both jointly owned by the debtor and his
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that trust serves as the foundation for the laws
of contract. I ground my argument in key contract-law doctrines re-
lated to good faith, public policy, and contractual assent, all of which
challenge the classical will theory and parallel the intuitive respect so-
ciety has for a person who keeps her promises. By identifying con-
tractual expectation with the idea of trust and by considering the
actual expectations of the contracting parties, as well as the ideal ex-
pectations of the public, this Article develops the triangle-of-expecta-
tions model as the most coherent account of modern contract law
today. This model also contributes to stability, certainty, and the abil-
ity of one person to rely on another and on the contractual institution.
Moreover, it also explains the complex economic, social, and commu-
nal interactions modern contract law is asked to face, many of which
are no longer based on the freedom of contractual choice in its classi-
cal sense.
wife (respondents). The Israeli Supreme Court, truer to the triangle-of-expectations test, attrib-
uted contractual validity to her signature which was made blindly, finding that in so signing she
had placed full trust in her husband. In its ruling, the court inculcated the idea of interpersonal
trust, in that it fulfilled the expectations of the bank (the promisee) regarding the liability of the
two respondents and of the public. The high court's ruling corresponds to the reasonable expec-
tations of the public and to its ideal expectations regarding the standing and formation of con-
tractual liability.
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